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A year ago, I considered thenow all but forgotten fiascoof the 2000 US Presidentialelection (“US Electoral Re-
form: The Obvious Obliga-
tion,” Computer, Feb. 2001, pp. 128,
126-127) and suggested ways that dig-
ital technology might help make elec-
tions to an office such as the presidency
more democratic. The election of demo-
cratic representatives, on the other
hand, presents a far more complex issue
that offers more significant possibilities
for exploiting digital technology.
OCHLOCRACY AND
ECONOMOCRACY
Democracy means rule by the peo-
ple, and the term refers in an abstract
way to a process or institution under
which government openly solicits, pre-
serves, and fosters information about
its citizens’ interests. At the heart of a
typical democratic government lies a
chamber of representatives that decides
issues by vote.
We must not confuse democracy
with ochlocracy—or mob rule—the
nightmare outcome likely to occur if
those who advocate using the marvels
of digital technology to give everyone
voting rights on every issue have their
way. Anyone who doubts the hideous
dangers of this approach should read
Naomi Klein’s description in No Logo
(Flamingo Press, London, 2000; see
also http://nologo.org/publication.
shtml) of how effectively branding can
influence public attitudes. In an online
ochlocracy, branding would be a superb
technique for enabling special interest
groups to become mobsters.
Economocracy lies near the end of
the political spectrum opposite ochloc-
racy, and is alleged by many to be the
creed of Australia’s two largest politi-
cal parties, which contested the federal
elections this past November. The main
opposition party, the Australian Labor
Party, promised that if elected it would
implement an elaborately planned
“Knowledge Economy.”
Meanwhile, the incumbent Liberal
Party based its campaign on claims of
superior economic management. The
Liberals had ousted the Labor Party
from office in 1996 by condemning its
economic management, citing in-
creased foreign debt as “the final
indictment.” 
Yet under Liberal Party rule,
Australia’s foreign debt rose from 38.2
percent of gross domestic product in
June 1996 to 46.7 percent in June 2001
(Australian Financial Review, 29 Oct.
2001, p. 56).
The tenor of these campaign tactics
indicates that the Australian govern-
ment—and by extension the govern-
ments of similar countries—is more
concerned with the economy than with
its citizenry, regardless of how that cit-
izenry voted. 
The new Federal Minister for
Education’s post-election proclama-
tion underlined this theme. The minis-
ter accused the university sector of
being reluctant to embrace change,
then promised to “consult with busi-
ness over what changes are necessary
to ensure the universities better meet
the community’s needs” (Australian
Financial Review, 17 Dec. 2001, p.3).
Whether justified or not, the per-
ception of incipient economocracy
must be reversed. For, to paraphrase a
much admired judicial maxim, democ-
racy must not only be done, it must
also be seen to be done.
Making elected representatives more
democratic and responsive to those
represented, or at least less liable to
accusations of moving in the opposite
direction, seems an obvious measure.
The computing profession has a
responsibility to take part in publicly
discussing democratic reform, and in
particular to make suggestions about
how such reform could employ digital
technology.
The need for reform extends beyond
Australia, given that many of the
Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development’s 29 other mem-
bers appear just as economocratically
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equal in population can confound rep-
resentatives with a continually shifting
constituency, making it hard for them
to press effectively for recognition of
their constituent’s interests.
Digital technology can enable
reforms that would greatly lessen these
difficulties. It could, for example, sup-
port the principle of “one voter, one
vote.” With fairly simple identification
and voting equipment installed in its
debating chamber, a legislative body
could give every elected representative
one vote for every voter in their elec-
torate.
Each representative would thus cast
a different number of votes, and
although rules would be needed to pre-
vent a gross imbalance between elec-
torates, mild imbalance could be quite
acceptable in improving quality of rep-
resentation. Australia currently aims
to achieve a limit of 3.5 percent imbal-
ance, a very low figure that leads to
electoral boundaries that writhe like
screen savers. 
Allowing mild imbalances, say up to
one third, would also eliminate the need
to continually redraw electoral bound-
aries. Better still, on those rare occasions
when gross imbalance develops, re-
drawing the boundaries would be much
simpler because the allowed mild imbal-
ance would permit more natural elec-
torate coalescing and splitting.
A digital voting system would offer
an additional advantage to electoral
systems that do not make registration
and voting compulsory: Representa-
tives would need to be responsive to
their voters if they wanted to increase
voter turnout and, in turn, their own
inclined. The organization’s very name
suggests that tendency.
ONE CITIZEN, ONE VOTE
Democracy in its purest form
demands that each citizen be able to
exert the same influence as do all oth-
ers. Following this principle, every
voter’s ballot counts as exactly one
vote in democratic elections.
In present-day chambers of represen-
tatives, however, it’s not the voters who
count equally, but the representatives.
A representative’s vote thus carries the
same weight whether he represents
100,000 citizens or 1,000,000. Three
clearly undemocratic consequences
arise from this system.
First, there is a restraint on allowing a
sparse rural electorate to have fewer cit-
izens than a compact urban electorate.
Imbalance in electorate populations has
been accepted in many countries to
counter the city dwellers’ advantage of
easier access to their representative, but
this practice soon leads to an abuse
called malapportionment (http://www.
utahhistorytogo.org/lemalapport.shtml).
Governments usually counter malap-
portionment with equal-population
electorates, but in Australia federal elec-
toral areas range from 26 square kilo-
meters to far more than 2 million square
kilometers. Maintaining the democrat-
ically necessary personal presence in
these larger areas presents representa-
tives with a staggering challenge.
Second, equalizing the number of
citizens within established electoral
boundaries makes it difficult to have
such boundaries match the commu-
nity’s natural borders. This approach
undemocratically fractures some elec-
torates’ communities, leading to poor
coordination and disparities between
electorates. These artificial boundaries
also mix parts of different natural com-
munities within electorates, leading to
conflicts of interest and difficulties in
providing clear and forceful represen-
tation of community interests.
Third, when the population in a
region fluctuates, redrawing electoral
boundaries to keep the electorates
influence. Likewise, ignoring voters
would likely cause a representative’s
influence to dwindle.
THE TWO-PARTY VOTE
A digital voting system could also
eliminate the classical gerrymander.
This maneuver, often made possible by
weak or corrupt electoral administra-
tions, aims to draw electoral bound-
aries so that the ruling party wins its
electorates by a small margin, but
crowds the opposition party’s voters
together into fewer but more populous
districts. This tactic makes it possible
for a party to have a majority of rep-
resentatives elected with much less
than a majority of votes overall.
To quash gerrymandering, an elec-
toral administration could create much
larger electorates, each of which would
have two representatives from different
political parties. When voting as repre-
sentatives, each would cast as many
votes as they received in the election.
For example, if an electorate’s rep-
resentative A took office with 256,000
votes, and representative B with
199,000, then A would cast 256,000
votes on any issue, while B could cast
only 199,000. Digital technology
would make administering such a sys-
tem easy.
Simple variations on this scheme
could make direct representation of
minor-party voters possible, even
across multiple electorates. In federal
governments that have a chamber, such
as the US Senate, in which states of the
federation have equal representation,
digital technology could support the
sharing of any state’s voting power
between representatives in proportion
to the votes they are elected by. This
approach would be simpler and fairer
than the proportional representation
schemes now adopted in some coun-
tries (http://www.prairienet.org/icpr/
links.html).
Having two representatives for an
electorate provides the significant addi-
tional advantage of helping voters
avoid the feelings of despair and apa-
thy that often occur under typical, sin-
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gle-winner election systems. When
their preferred candidate loses, or
when a candidate they strongly object
to wins, voters in such systems feel
unrepresented, diminishing their faith
in the democratic process.
CONTINUOUS ELECTIONS
The voting schemes I’ve suggested
leave intact one great perceived failing
of present systems: the great brouhaha
surrounding the periodic general elec-
tion of representatives.
In the time leading up to an election,
candidates barrage the populace with
bombast, promises, and ads, while
marginal but key electorates often
receive lavish bribes—usually in the
form of lucrative government con-
tracts—in exchange for votes. Many
voters feel that their representatives
only really care about them at election
time. At other times, those representa-
tives pay more attention to the inter-
ests of those who supported their
election campaigns financially in the
past or might do so in the future.
We could employ digital technology
to implement continuous elections,
thereby reducing this problem greatly.
This radical and apparently impractical
solution has advantages so profound we
should not dismiss it out of hand.
Continuous elections would require a
computer-based electoral system and an
administration under which citizens
could enter an electoral office, either
physically or electronically, and cast a
vote at any time, with certain restric-
tions.
The electoral administration would
set the voting entitlement of represen-
tatives for any sitting of a legislative
chamber at some statutory time shortly
before the sitting. Electoral voting fig-
ures would be published regularly—
say weekly—so that representatives
would get frequent and direct feedback
on how the electorate viewed their per-
formance. This system would also
eliminate the posturing and rhetoric
that comes with opinion polling.
Avoiding instability is a system engi-
neering principle usually applied by
smoothing inputs. In a continuous
election, system inputs could be
smoothed by forbidding change of any
vote within six months of it being cast.
Another smoothing technique would
call for old votes to lapse after a strict
three years unless recast.
We could eliminate another source
of instability by providing an orderly
transition from a retiring representa-
tive to a new one, allowing them to
split their party’s vote for a transition
period. The continuous election system
could even allow the electorate to
choose between candidates for replace-
ment.
Instability could still occur if we
apply continuous elections to a parlia-
mentary system in which governments
form from the elected representatives
of the majority party or from the
majority coalition of parties. But rapid
changes in such governments could be
prevented by applying a honeymoon
bias for the voting entitlements of a
new government’s members, a bias
that would gradually diminish to zero,
or even beyond. For example, digital
technology could apply a 10 percent
honeymoon bias upon change of gov-
ernment, making each normal vote
worth 1.1, and diminish that bias for
each subsequent legislative sitting at a
rate that would bring the bias to zero
after eighteen months. If occasional
changes of government were thought
worth encouraging, the bias could con-
tinue to be diminished until it reached
−5 percent.
S table governments consist ofpoliticians who see their owninterests tightly bound up in the
political system’s stability. Thus, keep-
ing the system unchanged provides the
only issue short of a national emer-
gency likely to attract overt and enthu-
siastic cross-party support.
To achieve any democratic reform in
stable countries, the electorate must
first be clearly aware of the nature and
benefits of potential practical reforms,
then must press strongly for such
reforms. The necessary reforms can be
envisioned clearly only after careful
and detailed consideration of reform
measures, a process in which comput-
ing professionals can play an impor-
tant role. As technologists, govern-
ments need our support to ensure that
reformers make the best possible use
of digital machinery, and to ensure that
the public clearly understands any such
use. As system engineers, governments
need our support to ensure that any
reforms proposed are, as a system,
practical and reliable, and to anticipate
and counter the inevitable politically
motivated criticisms. This last task pre-
sents an especially daunting challenge
because of the many loopholes and pit-
falls that must be avoided. 
Countries with unstable govern-
ments face a much more complex situ-
ation. Divisiveness, chaos, and un-
certainty present at best a moving tar-
get for reform, and they may make
implementing digital technology irrel-
evant.
Any computing professional who
feels doubt about the directions a gov-
ernment is taking has a duty to air
those doubts, as I have done here. If
that professional sees a need for demo-
cratic reform that would benefit the
community, duty also demands that
the professional advise the community
about how to best use digital technol-
ogy and system engineering in pursuit
of that reform. 
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